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Although  there  are  distinct  conjectures  about  the  relationship  between  finance  and  income  inequality, 
little  empirical  research  compares  their  explanatory  power.  We  examine  the  relationship  between 
finance  and  income  inequality  for  83  countries  between  1960  and  1995.  Because  financial  develop 
ment  might  be  endogenous,  we  use  instruments  from  the  literature  on  law,  finance,  and  growth  to 
control  for  this.  Our  results  suggest  that,  in  the  long  run,  inequality  is  less  when  financial  development 
is  greater,  consistent  with  Galor  and  Zeira  (1993)  and  Banerjee  and  Newman  (1993).  Although  the 
results  also  suggest  that  inequality  might  increase  as  financial  sector  development  increases  at  very 
low  levels  of  financial  sector  development,  as  suggested  by  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990),  this 
result  is  not  robust.  We  reject  the  hypothesis  that  financial  development  benefits  only  the  rich.  Our 
results  thus  suggest  that  in  addition  to  improving  growth,  financial  development  also  reduces 
inequality. 
JEL Classification:  D3, G2,  Ol 
1.  Introduction 
Recent  studies  have  shown  that  financial  sector  development  boosts  economic  growth  (Levine 
1997b).1  But  many  people  worry  that financial  development  benefits  only  the rich  and  powerful. 
Because  financial  markets  are  fraught  with  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  problems,  borrowers 
need  collateral.  The  poor,  who  do  not  have  this, might,  therefore,  find  it difficult  to get  loans  even 
when  financial  markets  are  well  developed.  In  contrast,  the  rich  who  do  have  property  that  can  be  used 
as  collateral  might  benefit  as  the  financial  sector  develops.  If  financial  development  improves  access 
for  the rich,  but not  the poor,  it  might  worsen  inequality. 
But  this  might  not  be  the  case.  As  the  financial  sector  grows,  the  poor,  who  were  previously 
excluded  from  getting  loans,  might  gain  access  to  it.  In  this  respect,  finance  might  be  an  equalizer  for 
people  with  talents,  ambition,  and  persistence.  Rajan  and  Zingales  (2003,  p.  92)  argue  that  the 
revolution  in  financial  markets  is  "opening  the  gates  of  the  aristocratic  clubs  to  everyone,"  as 
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For  the relationship  between  financial  development  and  growth  see,  among  others,  Beck,  Levine,  and Loayza  (2000),  Levine, 
Loayza,  and Beck  (2000),  and Rousseau  and Wachtel  (2000). 
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witnessed  by  the observation  that, "in  1929, 70% of  the  income  of  the top 0.01%  of  income  earners  in 
the  United  States  came  from  holding  of  capital....  In  1998,  wages  and  entrepreneurial  income  made 
up  80% of  the  income  of  the top 0.01%  of  income  earners  in the United  States,  and only  20%  came 
from  capital." 
Consistent  with  the  idea  that financial  development  might  benefit  the poor,  several  theoret 
ical models  suggest  that  income  inequality  will  be  lower when  financial  markets  are better  devel 
oped  (Banerjee  and  Newman  1993;  Galor  and  Zeira  1993).  These  models  show  that when 
investments  are  indivisible,  financial  market  imperfections  perpetuate  the  initial wealth  distribution, 
resulting  in  a  negative  relationship  between  financial  development  and  income  inequality  even  in  the 
long  run. 
Although  the  relation  between  inequality  and financial  development  could  be  linear,  it  is also 
possible  that  different  mechanisms  dominate  at  different  levels  of  financial  sector  development, 
leading  to  a  nonlinear  relationship  between  financial  sector  development  and  inequality.  Greenwood 
and Jovanovic  (1990)  show  how  financial  and economic  development  might  give  rise  to an  inverted 
U-shaped  relationship  between  income  inequality  and financial  sector  development.  In  their model, 
income  inequality  first rises  as  the financial  sector  develops  but  later declines  as more  people  gain 
access  to  the  system. 
The  relation  between  financial  development  and  income  distribution  is  important  for  policy 
makers?policy  makers  want  to  know  how  policies  affect  inequality  as  well  as  how  they  affect 
growth. Although  recent work  has  established  a robust  link between  financial  sector development  and 
economic  growth  (Levine  1997b),  less  work  has  focused  on  the  relation  between  financial  sector 
development  and  inequality.  Understanding  this  relationship  will  allow  policy  makers  to  assess 
whether  financial  development  will  improve  inequality  and when  it  might  be  useful  in doing  so. 
Because  different  theoretical  models  give  different  predictions  about  the distributional  impact  of 
financial  development  on  inequality,  empirical  investigation  is needed  to distinguish  between  the 
competing  conjectures.2 
This  paper  analyzes  the  relation  between  the  distributional  impact  of  financial  intermediary 
development  and  income  distribution  using  data  from  developing  and  developed  countries  from 
between  1960  and  1995.  Specifically,  we  analyze  whether  financial  intermediary  development  affects 
income  inequality  and  whether  the  impact  depends  on  the  level  of  financial  development.  Because  the 
different  mechanisms  might  be  more  powerful  at  different  levels  of  financial  sector  development,  we 
allow  the  relationship  to  be  nonlinear.  Further,  because  causation  could  run  either  from  financial 
sector  development  to  inequality  or  from  inequality  to  financial  sector  development,  we  control  for 
endogeneity  using  instruments  for  financial  sector  development  suggested  in  the  financial  sector 
development-growth  literature  (see,  for  example,  Levine  1997a,  1999). 
Our  results  show  that  inequality  decreases  as  financial  markets  deepen,  consistent  with  Galor  and 
Zeira  (1993)  and Banerjee  and Newman  (1993).  Although  some weak  evidence  suggests  that at  low 
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Li,  Squire,  and Zou  (1998)  and Li,  Xu,  and Zou  (2000)  include  financial  sector  development  in regressions  looking  at factors 
that affect  income  inequality.  This  paper,  however,  differs  from  Li,  Squire,  and Zou  (1998)  and Li,  Xu,  and Zou  (2000)  in 
several  ways.  First,  neither  of  these  earlier  papers  is primarily  concerned  with  the  impact  of  financial  sector  development  on 
inequality.  Li,  Squire,  and Zou  (1998)  focus  on  explaining  international  and  intertemporal  variations  in  income  inequality, 
whereas  Li,  Xu,  and Zou  (2000)  focus  on  the relationship  between  corruption  and  inequality  (and growth).  They  do  not  try to 
distinguish  the various  hypotheses  as we  do  here;  that  is,  they  assume  a  linear  relationship,  and  given  their  focus,  they  do  not 
run a battery  of  specifications  to examine  the  robustness  of  their  results.  In addition,  they  do  not  deal with  the endogeneity  of 
financial  development,  use  a  different  measure  of  financial  sector  development  that measures  financial  development  less 
precisely  (M2  over  GDP),  and  only  include  results  from  a pooled  cross  section. 580  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
levels  of  financial  development  inequality  might  increase  as  financial  sector  development  increases, 
that  is,  that  there  is  an  inverted  U-shaped  relation  between  financial  sector  development  and  income 
inequality,  as  suggested  by Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1990),  this  second  result  is not  highly  robust. 
We  strongly  reject  the hypothesis  that financial  development  benefits  only  the rich: We  do  not  find 
a positive  and  significant  relation  between  financial  development  and  inequality  after  controlling  for 
the  endogeneity  of  financial  sector  development. 
In  the  next  section,  we  briefly  review  the  theoretical  literature  on  the  relation  between  income 
inequality  and  financial  sector  development.  We  then  discuss  the  data  that  we  use  to  test  the 
theoretical  hypotheses  in Section  3. After  discussing  the empirical  specification  and  some  estimation 
issues  in Section  4, we  present  empirical  results  in Section  5  and  conclude  in Section  6. 
2.  Theoretical  Perspectives  on  Finance  and  Inequality 
Although  most  economists  would  not  expect  financial  development  to widen  income  inequality 
in  the  long  run,  the  popular  press,  some  literature,  and  Marxist  theory  often  depict  financiers  as  greedy 
middlemen  who  serve  only  the  interest  of  the  rich  and  well  connected.  Indeed,  these  views  are  so 
common  that  the  first  chapter  of  a  recent  book  defending  the  free-market  system  by  two  famous 
economists,  Rajan  and Zingales  (2003),  is entitled  "Does  finance  benefit  only  the rich?" 
One  plausible  reason  why  financial  development  might  benefit  the  rich,  especially  when 
institutions  are weak,  is  that the financial  system might  mainly  channel money  to  the rich  and well 
connected,  who  are  able  to  offer  collateral  and  who  might  be  more  likely  to  repay  the  loan,  while 
excluding  the poor.3  As  financial  sectors  become  more  developed,  they might  lend more  to rich 
households  but  continue  to neglect  the  poor  who  are  unable  to provide  collateral.  As  a  result,  even  as  the 
financial  sector  develops,  the  poor  remain  unable  to migrate  to  urban  areas,  invest  in  education,  or  start 
new  businesses.  This  tendency might  be  reinforced  if the rich  are able  to prevent  new  firms  from getting 
access  to  finance,  preventing  them  from  entering,  and  reducing  the  ability  of  the  poor  to  improve  then 
economic  lot.  If  this  were  the  case,  we  would  expect  to  see  a  positive  relation  between  financial 
development  and  income  inequality?at  least  at  some  levels  of  financial  development.  We  call  this  story 
the  inequality-widening  hypothesis  of  financial  development. 
Although  the  previous  arguments  suggest  that  high-income  households  might  benefit  more 
from  financial  sector  development  than  low-income  households,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  As 
financial markets  become  deeper,  and access  to finance  improves,  households  that did not  previously 
have  access  to finance  might  be  the main  beneficiaries.  Because  poor  households  cannot  invest  in 
human  and  physical  capital  or  bear  the  start-up  costs  associated  with  starting  a  new  business  using 
only  their  own  resources,  they  will  be  unable  to  do  so  unless  they  can  borrow.  In  contrast,  rich 
households  are  able  to  draw  on  their  own  resources  for  investment  whatever  the  level  of  financial 
sector  development.  Therefore,  capital  constraints  might  be  less  binding  for  rich  households 
at  any  level  of  financial  sector  development,  and  so  they might  gain  less when  these  constraints 
are  loosened. 
Several  recent  theoretical  models  have  formalized  this  intuition,  suggesting  that  capital 
market  imperfections  might  increase  income  inequality  during  economic  development.  Banerjee 
and Newman  (1993)  and Galor  and  Zeira  (1993)  suggest  that  capital  market  imperfections  and 
3 
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indivisibilities  in investment  in human  or physical  capital may  lead  to divergence  of  income  for  the 
rich  and  the poor  even  in  the  long  run. Further,  depending  on  the  initial wealth  distribution,  these 
imperfections  might  mean  that  income  inequality  persists  even  in  the  long  run. 
Galor  and  Zeira  (1993)  construct  a  two-sector  model  with  bequests  between  generations,  where 
agents  who  make  an  indivisible  investment  in  human  capital  can  work  in  a  skill-intensive  sector. 
However,  given  capital  market  imperfections,  only  individuals  with  bequests  larger  than  the  invest 
ment  amount  or  who  can  borrow  will  be  able  to make  this  investment.  This  results  in  income  inequal 
ity  that  is perpetuated  through  bequests  to  the  next  generation.  In  their  model,  an  economy  with  capital 
market  imperfections  and an  initially unequal  distribution  of wealth  will  maintain  this  inequality  and 
grow  more  slowly  than  a  similar  economy  with  a more  equitable  initial  distribution  of  wealth.  Simi 
larly,  Banerjee  and  Newman  (1993)  construct  a  three-sector  model,  in which  two  of  the  technologies 
require  indivisible  investment.  Because  of  capital  market  imperfections,  only  rich  agents  can  borrow 
enough  to  run  these  indivisible,  higher-return  technologies.  Once  again,  the  initial  distribution  of 
wealth  has  long-run  effects  on  income  distribution  and  growth  in  the  presence  of  capital  market 
imperfections.  With  all  else  remaining  equal,  these  models  suggest  that  countries  with  larger  capital 
market  imperfections,  that is, higher  hurdles  to borrow  funds  to finance  indivisible  investment,  should 
have  higher  income  inequality.  Consequently,  we  should  observe  a  negative  relationship  between 
financial  development  and  income  inequality.  We  call  this  hypothesis  the  inequality-narrowing  hypo 
thesis  of  financial  development. 
Offering  a  related,  but  different,  perspective  on  these  basic  ideas,  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic 
(1990)  present  a  theoretical  model  that  has  elements  of  both  ideas.  In  their  model,  agents  operate  the 
more  profitable,  but more  risky,  of  two  technologies  only when  they can diversify  risk  by  investing  in 
financial  intermediary  coalitions.  However,  the  fixed  costs  (e.g.,  membership  fees)  associated  with 
these  coalitions  prevent  low-income  individuals  from  joining  them. Assuming  that poor  individuals 
save  less  and  thus  accumulate  wealth  more  slowly,  income  differences  between  (high-income) 
members  of  intermediary  coalitions  and  (low-income)  outsiders  will  widen,  resulting  in  an  increase  in 
income  inequality.  However,  because  the  entrance  fee  is  fixed,  all  agents  eventually  join  these  coa 
litions,  resulting  in  an  eventual  reversal  in  the  upward  trend.  Consequently,  Greenwood  and 
Jovanovic's  (1990)  model  predicts  a hump  or  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  income  inequal 
ity  and  financial  sector  development,  with  income  inequality  first  increasing  and  then  decreasing 
before  eventually  stabilizing  in  the  long  run  as  more  people  join  financial  coalitions.  We  call  this 
hypothesis  the  inverted  U-shaped  hypothesis  of  financial  development. 
There  are,  thus,  quite  different  predictions  about  the  relation  between  financial  intermediaries 
and  income  inequality.  Yet  distinguishing  among  these  three  hypotheses  is  important.  If  the 
inequality-narrowing  hypothesis  is  correct,  improving  the  access  to  finance  would  reduce  inequality 
and  benefit  low-income  households  in rich  and  in  poor  countries  alike.  In  contrast,  if  the  inverted  U 
shaped hypothesis  is correct,  improving  the access  to finance might  initially worsen  income  inequality 
in  poor  countries,  improving  it  only  after  the  country  has  passed  a  certain  stage  of  financial  sector 
development.  Finally,  if the  inequality-widening  hypothesis  is true, some  countries might  be  trapped 
in a high-inequality  world  that would  be  only  worsened  by  financial  sector  development.  In what 
follows,  we  use  data  from  a  broad  cross  section  of  countries  between  1960  and  1995  to  assess  the 
empirical  validity  of  the different  hypotheses. 
It  is perhaps  useful  to  note  that  the  inverted U-shaped  hypothesis  concerns  a  situation  in 
which  the  empiricist  observes  the  evolution  of  income  inequality  and  financial  development 
during  the  development  process.  Thus,  the  relationship  would  be  most  likely  to  show  up  in 
short-  or  medium-run  time-series  or  panel  data.  In  contrast,  testing  the  inequality-widening  and 582  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
inequality-narrowing  hypotheses  might  require  long-run  data,  such  as  cross-sectional  data  based  on 
long  time  series. 
3.  Data 
This  section  describes  our  indicators  and  data  for  financial  intermediary  development  and 
income  inequality  as well  as  the set of  conditioning  information. Table  1 presents  descriptive  statistics 
and correlations.4  The  income  inequality data are based  on  a new  data  set of Gini  coefficients  compiled 
by Deininger  and Squire  (1996)  and  extended  by Lundberg  and Squire  (2000). Although  the original 
data  set  contained  over  2600  observations,  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996)  and Lundberg  and  Squire 
(2000)  limited  the data  set by  imposing  several  quality  conditions.  First,  all  observations  had  to be 
from  national  household  surveys  for  expenditure  or  income.  Second,  the  coverage  had  to  be  repre 
sentative  of  the  national  population.  Third,  all  sources  of  income  and  uses  of  expenditure  had  to  be 
accounted  for,  including  own  consumption.5 
To  explore  whether  there  is  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  economic  development 
and  income  inequality,  as proposed  by Kuznets  (1955),  we  regress  the  logarithm  of  the Gini  coef 
ficient  on  the log of  real per  capita GDP  and  its square. Figure  1 shows  the result for  the panel  sample. 
The  graph  suggests  the  existence  of  an  inverted  U-shaped  curve.  However,  this  graph  does  not  control 
for  alternative  explanations  of  income  inequality,  such  as  financial  depth. 
The  recent  literature  on  the  relationship  between  financial  intermediary  development  and 
economic  growth  has developed  several  indicators  to proxy  for the ability  of financial  intermediaries  to 
identify  profitable  projects,  monitor  and  control  managers,  ease  risk  management,  and  facilitate 
resource  mobilization.  We  concentrate  on  credit  to  the  private  sector  by  financial  intermediaries  over 
GDP  (private  credit).  This  indicator, which  comprises  credit  to private  firms  and  households  from 
banks  and  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  (but  which  excludes  central  banks  as  lenders  and  govern 
ment  and  state-owned  enterprises  as  borrowers),  seems  a  good  proxy  variable  for  the  extent  to which 
private  sector  agents  have  access  to  financial  intermediation  (as  in Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  1990)  or 
access  to  loans  (as  in Banerjee  and  Newman  1993,  Galor  and  Zeira  1993).  Many  recent  studies  that  have 
looked  at  the  effect  of  financial  sector  development  on  economic  growth  have  used  this  variable  as 
a measure  of  financial  sector  development,  showing  that  growth  is  faster  in  countries  where  private 
credit  is higher  (see,  for example,  Beck,  Levine,  and Loayza  2000;  Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck  2000). 
To  assess  the  robustness  of  results,  we  use  a  second  measure  of  financial  development:  claims  on 
the nonfinancial  domestic  sector by  deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP  (bank assets).  In contrast 
to private  credit,  this measure  excludes  credits  by  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  and  includes 
credit  to  governments  and  state-owned  enterprises. 
4 
The  sample  includes  Algeria,  Argentina,  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Burkina  Faso,  the Bahamas,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil, 
Cameroon,  Canada,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt, 
El  Salvador,  Finland,  France,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Germany,  Ghana,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Guinea  Bissau,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Hong 
Kong  (China),  Indonesia,  India,  Ireland,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Jordan, Kenya,  Korea,  Luxembourg,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru, 
Philippines,  Portugal,  Senegal,  Sierra Leone,  Singapore,  South Africa,  Spain,  Sri Lanka,  Sudan,  Sweden,  Thailand,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Uganda,  United  Kingdom,  United  States  of America,  Venezuela,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe. 
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To  account  for different  sampling  methods,  we  adjust  the data  using  a method  suggested  by Deininger  and  Squire  (1996)  and 
also  applied  by  Li,  Squire,  and Zou  (1998)  and Lundberg  and  Squire  (2000).  Specifically,  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996)  find 
a  systematic  difference  of  6.6  points  between  the means  of  income-based  and  expenditure-based  Gini  coefficients.  We, 
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Table  1. Descriptive  Statistics 
Gini  Private  Bank  Initial GDP  Risk  of  Ethno-linguistic  Gov't  Inflation Mod  Sect. 
Coef.  Credit  Assets  per  Capita  Exprop.  Fract.  Cons.  Rate  Val.  Add. 
Number  of 
observations  205  205  205  205  205  163  205  205  205 
Mean  38.4  44.9  42.4  5552  7.3  0.25  14.3  1.15  86.0 
Minimum  22.4  1.6  2.5  160  3.3  0.00  5.6  1.00  43.3 
Maximum  61.1  202.8  132.1  20,367  10  0.86  27.9  3.22  99.6 
Gini 
coefficient  1.00 
Private  credit  -0.38  1.00 
(0.00) 
Bank  assets  -0.48  0.86  1.00 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Initial GDP  -0.59  0.69  0.61  1.00 
per  capita  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Risk  of  -0.59  0.64  0.66  0.78  1.00 
expropriation  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Ethnolinguistic  0.11  -0.38  -0.35  -0.45  -0.50  1.00 
fractionalization  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Government  -0.48  0.33  0.37  0.61  0.50  -0.36  1.00 
consumption  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Inflation  0.32  -0.28  -0.30  -0.22  -0.21  -0.03  -0.21  1.00 
rate  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.72)  (0.00) 
Modern  sector  -0.25  0.55  0.54  0.68  0.67  -0.68  0.47  -0.06  1.00 
value added/GDP (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.43) 
Gini,  measurement-adjusted  Gini  coefficient  from Deininger  and  Squire  (1996)  and Lundberg  and  Squire  (2003). 
GDP  per  capita,  real per  capita  GDP;  Source:  Loayza  et  al.  (1999). 
Private  Credit,  claims  on  the private  sector  by  financial  institutions  divided  by GDP.  Source:  Beck,  Demirgii?-Kunt,  and 
Levine  (2000). 
Bank  Assets,  claims  on  domestic  nonfinancial  sector  by  deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP.  Source:  Demirgii?-Kunt 
and Levine  (2000). 
Risk  of Expropriation,  index  indicating  risk  of  expropriation  through  confiscation  or  forced  nationalization.  Higher  values 
indicate  that risk  is  lower.  Source:  PRS  Group  (2003). 
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization,  average  value  of  five  indices  of  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,  with  values  ranging 
from  0  to  1, with  higher  values  indicating  greater  fractionalization.  Source:  Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck  (2000). 
Government  Consumption,  government  consumption  as  share  of GDP.  Source: World  Bank  (2004). 
Inflation  Rate,  log  difference  of  Consumer  Price  Index.  Source:  International  Monetary  Fund  (2002). 
Modern  Sector  Value  Added/GDP,  value  added  of  service  and  industrial  sectors  as  share  of  GDP.  Source:  World 
Bank  (2004). 
We  use  private  credit  rather  than  the  ratio  of money  and  quasimoney  (M2)  to GDP  (M2), 
a measure  commonly  used  to measure  financial  sector  development  (King  and  Levine  1993;  Levine 
and Zervos  1998),  for  several  reasons.  First,  the ratio of M2  to  GDP  includes  the  liabilities  of  central 
banks  in  addition  to  banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries.  Second,  it  includes  credit  to 
governments  and  state-owned  enterprises.  Because  of  this,  it  is  a  less  clean  measure  of  financial  sector 
development  than  private  credit. 
Our  sample  shows  a  large  variation  in  financial  intermediary  development.  Private  credit  ranges 
from  2%  of GDP  in Uganda  (1990-1995)  to over  200%  in Japan  (1990-1995).  The  indicators  of 
financial  intermediary  development  are positively  and  significantly  correlated  (see  Table  1). The 
pairwise  correlations  indicate  that income  inequality  is lower  in countries with  deeper  financial markets; 
financial  sector development  is significantly  and negatively  correlated with  the  Gini  coefficient.  Plotting 
the  logarithm  of  the Gini  coefficient  and  its fitted  value  (from  the regression  of  the  logarithm  of  the 584  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
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Figure  1. Log(Gini)  and  log(GDPper  capita)  in a panel  of  91  countries.  The  fitted  line  is from  a  regression  of  log(Gini) 
on  the  log  of  real per  capita  GDP  and  its  square.  All  data  are  averaged  over  seven  5-year  periods  between  1960  and  1995. 
Gini  coefficient  on  the logarithm of private  credit)  against  the logarithm of private  credit, Figure  2  sug 
gests  a  negative,  and  possibly  nonlinear,  relation  between  the  two. 
4.  Empirical  Framework 
To  further  explore  the  relationship  between  financial  intermediary  development  and  income 
inequality,  we  estimate  the  following  regression: 
In  (Gini Coef.it) 
=  ^o +  /(Financeit)  +  a2CV;, +  e,-,.  (i) 
As  discussed  previously,  claims  on  the  private  sector  by  financial  institutions  as  percentage  of  GDP 
(private  credit)  and  claims  on  the nonfinancial  domestic  sector by  deposit  money  banks  divided  by 
GDP  (bank  assets)  are  the  measures  of  financial  sector  development.  The  focus  of  the  analysis  is 
f(Financeit)  which,  based  on  earlier  discussions,  we  assume  has  the  following  functional  form: 
QL\iFinanceit  +  a^Financel. 
The  inequality-narrowing  hypothesis  predicts  an  <  0 and oti2  =  0,  the inequality-widening  hypothesis 
predicts  an  >  0  and ai2 =  0,  and  the  inverted U-shape  hypothesis  predicts  an  >  0  and ai2  <  0. 
In  addition  to  the  financial  sector  variables,  we  include  several  variables  to  control  for  other  factors 
that  might  affect  inequality.  Specifically,  we  include  linear and  squared terms of  the log of  (initial)  real 
per  capita  GDP  to  control  for  a direct  "Kuznets  effect"  of  economic  development  on  income  inequality 
that  is  independent  of  financial  intermediary  development.  Once  controlling  for  initial  GDP, 
f(Financeit)  captures  the  effects  of  finance  on  steady-state  inequality.  If  the  real  data  do  not  reflect 
steady-state  situations,  initial  GDP  would  capture  whatever  has  been  achieved  by  the  force  of 
convergence.  However,  because  per  capita  GDP  is highly  correlated  with  financial  sector  development, Finance  and  Income  Inequality  585 
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Figure  2. Log(Gini)  against  log(Private  Credit)  in a panel  of  91  countries.  The  fitted  line  is from  a regression  of  log(Gini) 
on  the  log  of  Private  Credit  and  its  square.  All  data  are  averaged  over  seven  5-year  periods  between  1960  and  1995. 
to make  sure  that  our  test  of  the  three  hypotheses  is  robust  with  respect  to  the multicollinearity  between 
GDP  per  capita  and  financial  development,  we  also  estimate  the  model  omitting  these  variables. 
In  addition  to  these  measures,  we  include  several  additional  control  variables.  We  include  the 
inflation  rate,  conjecturing  that monetary  instability  hurts  the  poor  and  the middle  class  relatively  more 
than  the  rich  because  the  latter  have  better  access  to  financial  instruments  that  allow  them  to  hedge 
their  exposure  to  inflation.6  We,  therefore,  expect  inflation  to  have  a  positive  coefficient. 
Additionally,  we  include  measures  of  government  consumption,  ethnolinguistic  fractionaliza 
tion,  and  a measure  of  the  protection  of  property  rights  (the  risk  of  expropriation).  We  might  expect 
income  inequality  to  be  higher  in  countries  where  ethnic  fractionalization  is  greater  if,  for  example, 
people  are  averse  to  redistribution  in  countries  where  ethnic  diversity  is  greater.7  This  variable  was  not 
available  across  time,  and,  therefore,  it  is  set  equal  to  the  same  value  for  all  periods. 
It  is  less  clear  whether  government  consumption  and  property  rights  protection  will  increase  or 
decrease  income  inequality.  For  example,  although  the  protection  of  property  rights  might  protect  the 
rich  against  expropriation  by  the  poor,  it  could  also  have  the  opposite  effect,  that  is,  protecting  the  poor 
against  exploitation  by  the rich.  Similarly,  if  most  redistribution  through  the tax and  transfer system  is 
toward  low-income  groups,  government  consumption  might  result  in  greater  equality.  However,  it 
could  also  have  the opposite  effect  if rich  households  use  their political  power  to exploit  the poor. 
6 
See,  for  example,  Easterly  and Fischer  (2001). 
7 
Consistent  with  this, Alesina,  Baqir,  and Easterly  ( 1999) find  that spending  on productive  public  goods  (e.g.,  on  schools)  is lower  in 
U.S.  cities  where  ethnic  diversity  is greater.  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  was  unavailable  for many  of  the countries  in our 
sample.  To  avoid  excessive  sample  loss, we  imputed  values  based  on  the other  regressors  for countries  with  missing  data. Results 
were  robust  to using  other  imputation  techniques,  including  hotdeck  imputation  (Mander  and Clayton  1999)  and multiple  impu 
tation  (Royston  2004).  Although  the hotdeck  approach was  used  for all regressions,  the  multiple  imputation  approach  could  be used 
only  for OLS  regressions.  Results  were  similar  in terms of  size and statistical  significance  for the coefficients  on  the finance  variables. 
Results  were  also  similar  for  those  coefficients  when  we  simply  dropped  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  from  the estimation. 586  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
Kuznets  (1955)  suggests  that  income  inequality  might  depend  on  the  sectoral  structure  of  an 
economy.  Thus,  we  include  a  variable  representing  the  share  of  value  added  accounted  for  by  services 
and  industry  (as  opposed  to  agriculture).  The  correlation  of  the modern,  that  is,  nonagricultural  sector, 
share of GDP  and GDP  per capita  indicates  that  richer  countries  have  larger  modern  sectors. Although 
the  simple  correlation  between  the modern  sector's  share  of  GDP  and  the  Gini  coefficient  is  negative, 
this  appears  to  be  because  poorer  countries  have  greater  inequality  and  larger  agricultural  sectors. 
After  controlling  for  per  capita  income,  the  partial  correlation  becomes  positive  and  significant. 
We  conduct  the  analysis  in  two  ways:  a pure  cross-sectional  analysis,  using  data  averaged  over  the 
entire  period  between  1960  and  1995,  and  a panel  data  analysis  using  five-year  panels.  The  cross-sectional 
analysis  might  capture  the  long-term  relationship  between  finance  and  inequality,  offering  a way  of  testing 
the  long-term  relationship  featured  in  the  inequality-narrowing  and  inequality-widening  hypotheses.  In 
contrast,  the  panel  analysis  might  examine  the  process  of  comovement  between  finance  and  inequal 
ity  and,  therefore,  might  be  a more  appropriate  setup  in which  to  test  the  inverted  U-shaped  hypothesis. 
Following  the  convention  of  most  cross-country  empirical  panel  studies,  the  panel  analysis  splits 
the  sample  period  1960  to  1995  into  seven  nonoverlapping  5-year  periods. We  use  5-year  periods 
rather  than  shorter  time  spans  because  although  financial  intermediary  data  are  available  on  a  yearly 
basis  for  most  countries  in  our  sample,  they  might  be  subject  to  business  cycle  fluctuations  that  are 
controlled  for by  averaging  over  longer  time periods.  All  panel  regressions  include  time dummies  to 
account  for  structural  differences  across  periods.  To  take  account  of  the  panel  structure  of  the  data, 
we  present  results  from  random  effects  estimation. 
Estimating  Equation  1 using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  (or random  effects)  estimation  might 
introduce  bias  because  OLS  does  not  allow  for  the  possibility  of  reverse  causality?that  is,  for  the 
possibility  that inequality affects  the  provision  of financial  services?something  suggested  in some of  the 
theoretical models.  For example,  in  Greenwood  and Jovanovic's  (1990) model,  the initial distribution  of 
wealth  affects  who  is  able  to  join  financial  intermediary  coalitions  and,  therefore,  might  affect  the  size  of 
the  financial  sector.  Because  we  are  primarily  interested  in  the  effect  of  financial  sector  development  on 
income  inequality,  we  use  an  instrumental  variables  approach,  adopting  instruments  for  financial  sector 
development  similar  to  the  ones  used  in Levine  (1997a,  1999),  which  assesses  the  exogenous  impact  of 
financial  intermediary  development  on  economic  growth.  The  instruments  are  a  set  of  dummy  variables 
proposed  by La Porta et al. (1998)  that identify  the origin  of  the country's  legal  system.8  We  use  the legal 
origin  dummy  variables,  rather  than  the  measures  of  creditor  rights,  also  proposed  by  La  Porta  et  al. 
(1998),  because  they  are  available  for  a wider  sample  of  countries.  Several  papers  have  shown  that 
differences  in  legal  origin  are  significantly  related  to  financial  sector  development,  perhaps  because 
different  legal  traditions put different  levels  of  emphasis  on  the rights  of property  owners  or because 
some  systems  are  more  adaptable  to  exogenous  changes  than  others.9  In  the  empirical  analysis,  we 
examine  the  validity  of  the  instruments  using  Hansen's  J-test  to  test  the  overidentifying  restrictions.10 
8 
The  measures  of  legal  origin  were  taken  from  the Global  Development  Network  Growth  Database  produced  by William 
Easterly  and Mirvat  Sewadeh  (see  Easterly  2001). 
9 
Beck,  Demirgii?-Kunt,  and Levine  (2001)  provide  an excellent  summary  of much  of  the empirical  and  theoretical  literature  on 
this  topic.  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998)  show  that protection  for  corporate  shareholders  and  creditors  are  strongest  in common  law 
countries  and weakest  in French  Civil  Law  countries.  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997)  relate  these  variables  to some measures  of  capital 
market  development  (external  market  capitalization  over  GDP,  number  of  listed  firms  per  capita,  initial  public  offerings), 
showing  that  they  are  generally  lower  in civil  law  (especially  French  Civil  Law)  countries  than  in common  law  countries. 
Beck,  Demirgii?-Kunt,  and Levine  (2001)  show  that private  credit  is  lower  in French  Civil  law countries  than  in  German  Civil 
Law  and  common  law  countries. 
10 
In  similar  regressions  of  financial  sector  development  on  economic  growth,  Levine  (1997a,  1999)  fails  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis  that  the  overidentifying  restrictions  are  valid. Finance  and  Income  Inequality  587 
5.  Empirical  Results 
Long-Term  Relationship  from  Cross-Sectional  Samples 
To  test  the  inequality-widening  and  the  inequality-narrowing  hypotheses,  we  regress  the  natural 
log of  the Gini  coefficient  on  linear  terms  for  the measure  of  financial  sector  development  (private 
credit)  and  the  additional  control  variables.  Before  we  control  for  the possible  endogeneity  of  the 
measures  of  financial  sector  development,  the  coefficient  on  private  credit  is  negative  but  statistically 
insignificant  (see  column  1 of  Table  2).  The  coefficient  on  banks  assets  is  also  negative  but  is 
statistically  significant,  indicating  that  inequality  is  lower  in  countries  where  bank  assets  are  greater  as 
a share of GDP  (see column  3 of Table  2). Results  for both measures  are qualitatively  similar when  we 
omit per  capita GDP  and per  capita GDP  squared from  the regression  (see Table  3). These  results,  as 
we  discussed  earlier,  do  not  take  into  account  the  issue  of  the  endogeneity  of  the  finance  variables. 
After  controlling  for endogeneity  using  the indicators of  legal origin  as instruments,  the coefficient 
on  private  credit  remains  negative  but  increases  in  size  and  becomes  statistically  significant  (see  column 
5).  Results  are  similar  when  bank  assets  are  used  as  the measure  of  financial  sector  development  (see 
column  7). This  suggests  that financial  sector development  reduces  income  inequality,  supporting  the 
inequality-narrowing  hypothesis  and  rejecting  the  inequality-widening  hypothesis  of  financial 
development.  Hypothesis  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  financial  variables  are  exogenous, 
favoring  the  results  from  the  2SLS  regressions,  consistent  with  the  theoretical  papers  that  view  financial 
development  as 
endogenous.11  In  addition,  we  are  unable  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  legal 
origin  dummies  are  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  after  controlling  for  the  other  variables,  suggesting 
that  they  are  appropriate  instruments  (see  Hansen  J-Statistics  in  the  relevant  tables).  Based  on  the 
coefficient  estimates  in column  5,  a  1% increase  in private  credit  decreases  the Gini  coefficient  by 
0.31%.  Results  are  similar when  per  capita GDP  is omitted  (see Table  3), with  the point  estimate  of 
the  parameter  slightly  smaller  at -0.27. 
To  test  the  inverted  U-shape  hypothesis  of  financial  development,  we  include  squared  terms  for 
the  measures  of  financial  sector  development  (see  columns  6  and  8).  Because  the  coefficient  on  the 
squared  term  is  statistically  insignificant  in all model  specifications,  the  results  do  not  support  this 
hypothesis.  Although  the  coefficient  on  the  linear  term becomes  statistically  insignificant  in both 
model  specifications  when  the  squared  term  is  included,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  coefficients  on 
the  linear  and  squared  terms  are  jointly  significant  at  a  1%  level  or  higher  when  financial  sector 
development  is  treated  as  endogenous.  Thus,  these  regressions  suggest  that  although  financial  sector 
development  does  affect  inequality,  it appears  to  do  so  in  a  roughly  linear  fashion.  However,  the  panel 
data might  provide  a better way  of  testing  the inverted U-shape  hypothesis  if panel  data better  capture 
short-  or  medium-run  variations  in  the  comovements  of  financial  development  and  inequality. 
After  controlling  for  the  endogeneity  of  the  financial  sector  variables,  many  of  the  coefficients  on 
the other  control variables  are statistically  insignificant  (see column  5 of  the relevant  tables). Although 
the coefficients  on  the linear and  squared  terms for  initial GDP  per  capita  are statistically  insignificant, 
they are jointly  significant  in  most  model  specifications.12  The  positive  coefficient  on  the  linear  term 
and  the  negative  coefficient  on  the  squared  term  suggest  an  inverted  U-shape,  with  income  inequality 
11 
When  we  perform  a Durbin-Wu-Hausman  test using  an  auxiliary  regression  (see Davidson  and MacKinnon  1993),  the null 
hypothesis  that "private  credit"  is exogenous  is rejected  at a  1% significance  level  (p-value 
=  0.001).  For  "bank  assets,"  the 
null  hypothesis  that  it  is exogenous  is  rejected  at  a  5%  significance  level  (/7-value 
=  0.043). 
12 
They  are  jointly  significant  at  a  1%  level  or  higher  when  bank  assets  are  included,  jointly  significant  at  a  10%  level  when 
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increasing  with  income  at  low  levels  of  income  and  decreasing  at  high  levels.  However,  the  turning 
point  appears  to be  relatively  low?it  is  less  than $600  in all  regressions  in Table  2  and  is close  to 
zero  when  private  credit  is  used  as  the  measure  of  financial  sector  development. 
When  bank  assets  are  used  as  the  measure  of  financial  sector  development,  the  coefficient  on 
ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  is statistically  significant  and positive  (columns  7  and  8),  suggesting 
that  income  inequality  might  be  higher  in  countries  with  greater  fractionalization.  This  finding 
supports  the  conjecture  that  citizens  prefer  less  redistribution  when  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  is 
greater.  However,  this  result  is  not  robust  because  it does  not  hold  when  private  credit  is  used  as  the 
measure  of  financial  sector  development.  The  negative  coefficient  on  inflation  suggests  that  inequality 
is  generally  lower  in  countries  where  inflation  is  greater. 
After  controlling  for  other  factors  that might  affect  income  inequality,  including  per  capita 
income  and  financial  sector  development,  the  coefficient  on  the  share  of  the  economy  accounted  for 
by  services  and  industry,  that  is,  sectors  other  than  agriculture,  is  positive  and  statistically  significant. 
This  suggests  that  income  inequality  is  lower  in  countries  where  agriculture  accounts  for  a  greater 
share  of  GDP. 
Short-  or Medium-Run  Results  from  the Panel  Sample 
In  addition  to  the  cross-sectional  results  presented  in  the  previous  section,  we  present  results 
from  panel  regressions.  In  addition  to  providing  a  useful  robustness  test,  this  might  also  provide  better 
information  on  the  short-  and  medium-run  relationship  between  finance  and  inequality.  As  noted  in 
the  previous  section,  we  divide  the  data  up  into  seven  five-year  periods.  To  control  for  structural 
differences  between  periods,  all  regressions  include  period  dummies.13  As  a  first  exercise,  we  treat  the 
financial  variables  as  exogenous  and  estimate  a  random-effects  regression. 
When  private  credit  is  treated  as  exogenous,  its  coefficient  is  small,  positive,  and  statistically 
insignificant  (see column  1 of Table  4). Although  the coefficient  on bank  assets  is negative,  its coef 
ficient  is also  statistically  insignificant  at conventional  significance  levels  (column  2). When  squared 
terms  are  added  to  the  base  regressions,  the  linear  and  squared  terms  are  statistically  insignificant  both 
singly  and jointly. 
A  first  question  is whether  the model  should  be  estimated  as  a  random-effects  model  or  whether 
a  fixed-effects  estimator  would  be  more  appropriate.  One  concern  with  respect  to  the  fixed-effects 
estimator  is  that  any  cross-sectional  variation  is  removed  when  country  dummies  are  added  to  the 
regression.  This  might  be  a  problem  because  although  inequality  varies  greatly  between  countries,  it 
varies  only  modestly  within  countries  over  time.  For  example,  Li,  Squire,  and  Zou  (1998)  show  that 
90%  of  the variance  in the Gini  coefficient  in their data  (an updated  version  of which  is used  in this 
paper)  is  cross-country  variation,  compared  with  less  than  1%  from  cross-time  variation.14  In  this 
respect,  fixed  effects  will  remove most  of  the variation  in inequality  that  we  are  trying  to explain.  In 
addition,  including  fixed  effects  might  exacerbate  problems  related  to measurement  error. This  is 
a particular  concern  because  income  distribution  is often measured  poorly,  and  although  inequality 
changes  slowly  over  time,  measurement  error  might  be  quite  different  in  different  periods.15  Hence, 
13 
When  we  added  time  dummies  and  tested  the joint  significance  of  these  dummies,  they were  statistically  significant  at a  1% 
level  or  higher  in all  of  the panel  specifications  in Table  4. 
14 
For  example,  Easterly  (2002)  suggests  that  it  is unclear  whether  standard  panel  methods  are  appropriate  given  that  income 
distribution  is  relatively  stable  over  time. 
15 
See  Griliches  and Hausman  (1986)  for  a discussion  of  errors  in variables  in panel  regressions. 592  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
Tf ^  <S  ^ 
es  en  oo  on 
tJ- o  O  en 
O  h  ?  -h 
I 
^h  ?n  m  vo 
o  es o  es 
^-h  oo  in  Tt  o  oo 










o  es 
in 
es 
^o  es  in  vo 
es  on o  m 
o  d  d  ^ 
on  es 
on ^  in  /-s 
Tt  es m  on 
oo  on p  en 
d  ?  d  in 
r-  on 
nom?  ?n oo o  r? 
o  ^  d  -h' 
r-  r-  es  on  Tt  r 




M-  -M-  -M 
o  es  oo  on  o  es 
cn^-sTt^es^m^m^es^  * 




-h  r  ^H  O 
d  es 
oo  ^^ en  ^ 
es o  in  ti 
oo  vq  p  p 
o  t? d  m' 
*-<  o  es  r-  t--  in 










C  HH 
I  O 
oo  es 
io  r^  ?-h  ^  o  m  o  r 
dodo 
I 
oo  m 
t--  y?v  ^o 
00  VO 'sf 
vo  es o 






m  ^ 
i-H  ON 
o  ^o 




O  -s  00 ^v 
es  es ^  en 
r-  vo o  es 
?  ^t ? 




o  o 
vo  ^  es ^ 
h  oo o  in 
o  -h o  -h 
dodo 
I 
O  ^r O  Tt 






^  vo ^v 
m  es  ^h oo  On 
?  ^h  en O  O 
^t  ^t  en  es  Tf  en 















On  ^ 
es  vo 
O  Tf 
?  -h" 
es  vo  rj-  oo  in  o  in 
vo  ^  vo  ^  r-^-vr-^vm^-^Tf^-v^^^ 
r^vo^^t  cnvoin^or-^Hcnoin 
vqcnpp  qino^HTto(sq^ 










Cl  ??  Cl 
Cm  -<  Cm O 
qO  SO  ?  ?  "3  I  s  sr 
o 
oo  es  vq  ^h 
d  h  ri  d  d 
O 
?  T3  > Finance  and  Income  Inequality  593 
including  fixed  effects,  which  remove  much  of  the  variation  in  inequality,  might  leave  us  with  a  small 
amount  of  variation  in  inequality  and  a  larger  amount  of  variation  in measurement  error. 
In  practice,  the  results  from  the  fixed-  and  random-effect  regressions  were  qualitatively  similar. 
When  "private  credit"  is  entered  linearly,  its  coefficient  is  positive  in  both  the  fixed-  and  random 
effects  regressions?although  the  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  in  the  fixed-effects 
specification.16  A  Hausman  test  fails  to reject  the null  hypothesis  that the coefficients  from  the  two 
models  with  private  credit  are  systematically  different,  favoring  the  random-effects  specification  for 
regressions  including  "private  credit."17  For  bank  assets,  the  results  for  the  financial  variables  are 
similar  in  the  fixed-  and  random-effects  models?the  coefficient  is  small  and  statistically  insignifi 
cant  in  both  specifications  when  entered  linearly.  However,  a Hausman  test  rejects  the  null  hypothesis 
that  the  coefficients  are  not  systematically  different  for  the  models  with  "bank  assets"  included, 
favoring  the  fixed  effects  regressions.18  As  in  the  cross-sectional  regressions,  there  is  no  evidence 
of  a  non-linear  effect?the  coefficients  on  the  squared  terms  are  statistically  insignificant  in  all 
model  specifications. 
The  results  from  the  cross-sectional  regressions  and  a  priori  reasoning  from  existing  theoretical 
models  on  finance  and  inequality  all  suggest  that  the  financial  variables  might  be  endogenous.19 
Therefore,  we  reestimate  the  panel  regressions  allowing  for  endogeneity.  Because  legal  origin  does 
not  change  over  time,  we  are  unable  to  estimate  instrumental  variable  regressions  that  include  fixed 
effects;  that  is,  the  instruments  are  collinear  with  the  country  dummies.  Therefore,  we  reestimate  the 
model  using  a random-effects  instrumental variables model  (see columns  5  to 8  in  Table  4). When  the 
financial  variables  are  entered  linearly,  the  coefficients  on  the  financial  sector  variables  are  negative 
and  statistically  significant.  This  is  consistent  with  the  cross-sectional  results. 
When  squared  terms  are  included  in  the  regression,  the  coefficients  on  the  squared  terms  are 
statistically  insignificant  in both  regressions  for both  financial  variables.  The  results  thus do  not  sup 
port  the  inverted  U-shaped  hypothesis  of  financial  development.  However,  as  before,  the  coefficients 
on  the  linear and  squared  terms are jointly  significant  (see final  row of Table  4). 
Although  most  of  the control  variables  remain  statistically  insignificant,  the panel  results  show 
greater  evidence  of  an  inverted U-shape  with  respect  to  initial GDP.  The  coefficients  on  initial GDP 
and  initial GDP  squared  are  statistically  significant  and  indicate  an  inverted U-shape.  In  the  IV 
random-effects  model,  the  turning point  is at about  $2300  in the private  credit  regression  and  $2200 
in  the  bank  asset  regressions.  Another  notable  difference  is  that  the  coefficient  on  the  risk  of 
expropriation  becomes  statistically  significant  and  negative,  indicating  that  inequality  is  greater  when 
the  risk  of  expropriation  is  greater.20 
In  contrast  to  the  results  for  the  cross  section,  results  for  the  panel  data  are  slightly  different  when 
initial  GDP  is dropped  from  the  main  regression  (see Table  5).  When  the financial  variables  are treated 
as  endogenous,  the  coefficients  on  the  linear  terms  remain  statistically  significant  and  negative  when 
16 
Results  from  fixed-effects  regressions  are  available  from  authors  on  request. 
17 
The  null  hypothesis  that  the  country  effects  are  uncorrelated  with  the  additional  variables  is not  rejected  at  conventional 
significance  levels  (p-value 
=  0.20). 
18 
The  null  hypothesis  is rejected  at  a  1% significance  level  (p-value  =  0.00). 
19 
Although  the Durbin-Wu-Hausman  test  is not  available  for  the  random-effects  models,  similar  tests  for  the panel  data when 
estimated  using  OLS  and  2SLS,  that  is,  as  a pooled  cross  section,  also  strongly  reject  the null  hypothesis  that  the financial 
variables  are  exogenous.  With  a Durbin-Hausman-Wu  test,  the null  hypothesis  is rejected  at a 5%  significance  level  for bank 
assets  (p-value 
=  0.044)  and  at a  1% significance  level  for  'private  credit'  (p-value  =  0.000).  The  coefficients  from  the  two 
stage  least-squares  model  using  the pooled  cross  section  are  similar  in  terms  of  size  and  statistical  significance  to  the  results 
from  the  IV  random  effects  model. 
20 
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entered  linearly.  However,  the  coefficient  on  the  linear  term  is  positive  and  statistically  significant, 
and  the  coefficient  on  the  squared  term  is  negative  and  statistically  significant  when  both  linear 
and  squared  terms  are  included.  This  is  broadly  supportive  of  the  inverted  U-shape  hypothesis 
with  inequality  first  increasing  as  financial  development  increases  and  then  decreasing.  The  point 
estimates  suggest  that  the  turning  point  is  at  about  when  private  credit  is  equal  to  22%  of  GDP. 
In 2003,  private  credit was  equal  to about  28%  of GDP  for  low-income  countries  and  64%  of GDP 
for middle  income  countries.21 Given  the  lack of  support  for  the  inverted U-shape  hypothesis  when 
initial GDP  is  included,  and  the  support  for  the hypothesis  without  the  inclusion  of  initial GDP, 
and  in  light  of  the  fact  of  a  close  correlation  between  finance  and  initial  GDP,  we  conclude  that  there 
is  some  weak  support  for  the  inverted  U-shape  hypothesis  when  short-term  and  medium-term 
variations  are  considered. 
To  summarize,  after  controlling  for  endogeneity,  we  find  support  for  the  inequality-narrowing 
hypothesis  that inequality  is  lower  in countries  with  better-developed  financial  sectors  and  reject  the 
inequality-widening  hypothesis  in  both  panel  and  cross  section.  In  contrast,  we  do  not  generally  find 
strong  support  for  the  inverted U-shape  hypothesis  in the  long-run  cross-sectional  data  but  do  find 
some  weak  support  for  it with  short-  and  medium-run  panel  data. 
6.  Conclusions 
There  has  been  little  systematic  empirical  study  on  the  relationship  between  finance  and 
inequality. This  paper  attempts  to examine  this  issue by  testing  empirically  distinct  predictions  made 
by  alternative  theories.  Specifically,  Galor  and Zeira  (1993)  and Banerjee  and Newman  (1993)  predict 
a negative  and  linear relationship  between  finance  and  the Gini  coefficient  (the  inequality-narrowing 
hypothesis),  some  popular  press  worry  about  the  inequality-widening  effects  of  financial 
development,  while  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990)  suggest  a  inverted U-shape  relationship  (the 
inverted  U-shape  hypothesis). 
Exploring  the  link  between  indicators  of  financial  intermediary  development  and  the Gini 
coefficient  in a  large cross-country  sample  for  the period  1960-1995,  we  experiment  with  both  simple 
specifications  and  more  sophisticated  specifications  that  control  for  simultaneity.  Overall,  our  results 
provide  some  support  for  the  inequality-narro  wing  hypothesis.  We  find  a  significant  negative 
coefficient  on  the measures  of  financial  intermediary  development  once  we  control  for  endogeneity? 
and  hypothesis  tests  suggest  that  this  is  important.  In  contrast,  the  results  decisively  reject  the 
inequality-widening  hypothesis.  Moreover,  while  the  cross-sectional  (long-term)  data  do  not  provide 
much  support  for  the  inverted  U-shaped  hypothesis,  the  short-  and  medium-term  panel  data  do 
provide  some  weak  support  for  the  inverted  U-shape  hypothesis.  Overall,  our  results  suggest  that  the 
growth-spurring  effects  of  financial  intermediary  development  are  likely  to  be  associated  with  positive 
effects  on  aggregate  income  distribution  as  well.22 
We  recognize  some  limitation  of  our  results,  which  stem  mostly  from  the  limitations  of  our  measure 
of  income  inequality. Changes  in the  Gini  coefficient  can come  about  in different ways,  by absolute  and 
relative  changes  in one  or  several  of  the different  income  quintiles. We  do not  explore  the  impact  that 
a higher  level of financial  intermediary development  has  on  the  income  level of  a specific  quintile,  for 
21 
Data  from World  Bank  (2004). 
22 
See  Levine  (1997b)  for  a  recent  literature  survey  on  this  topic.  See  also  Beck,  Demirgii?-Kunt,  and  Levine  (2001)  for 
a discussion  of more  recent  results. 596  Clarke,  Xu,  and Zou 
instance  the  poor.  Moreover,  even  results  obtained  by  using  quintile  data  have  to be  regarded  with  caution 
because  they  do  not  control  for  migration  between  the  quintiles  over  the  sample  period.  To  analyze 
directly  the effect  of financial  development  on  specific  groups  of  the population,  one would  have  to use 
disaggregated  data,  preferably  at  the  household  level.  This  poses  new  challenges  for  future  research. 
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